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Abstract
The literature shows that when a society believes that wealth is
determined by random “luck” rather than by merit, it demands more
redistribution. Adverse shocks, like earthquakes, strengthen the be-
lief that random “bad luck” can frustrate the outcomes achieved with
merit. We theoretically illustrate that individuals react to such shocks
by raising support for redistribution. We then present evidence of this
behavior by exploiting a natural experiment provided by one of the
strongest seismic events that occurred in Italy in the last three decades,
the L’Aquila earthquake in 2009. We assemble a novel dataset by
matching information on the ground acceleration registered through-
out the National Strong Motion Network during the earthquake with
survey data about individual opinions on redistribution collected a few
months later. The empirical analysis illustrates that the intensity of
the shakes is associated with subsequent stronger beliefs that, for a
society to be fair, income inequalities should be levelled by redistribu-
tion.
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1 Introduction
Redistributive policies rely on the prevalent beliefs about the fairness of
social competition. Previous research suggests that if a society believes that
socioeconomic success only depends on merit, and that everyone should fully
enjoy the fruits of her work, it will demand low redistribution. If, instead,
the belief prevails that wealth is mostly determined by random “luck”, such
as the fortune of being born in the right place into the right family, society
will support higher redistribution thus levying heavier taxes (Alesina and
Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Fong (2001) and Alesina and
La Ferrara (2005) provide individual-level evidence that a stronger belief that
luck matters in determining one’s position in the social ladder is associated
to higher support for redistribution.
Even if agents largely inherit their beliefs from ancestors (Guiso et al.,
2006), individual perceptions about the competing roles of luck and merit
also are the outcome of a life-long learning process. Piketty (1995), for
example, theoretically shows that unfortunate experiences can support the
belief that luck, instead of merit, plays a decisive role in income distribu-
tion, thereby raising aversion to inequality and consensus for redistributive
policies.
To study the relationship between adverse shocks and demand for redis-
tribution, we exploit a natural experiment provided by one of the strongest
seismic events that occurred in Italy in the last decades, the L’Aquila earth-
quake in 2009. A natural disaster can be seen as a manifestation of random
“bad luck”, i.e. the misfortune of living in the wrong place at the wrong
time, which demonstrates how exogenous events can frustrate the outcomes
achieved with merit.
Borrowing the theoretical set-up of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), we
first illustrate how the average support for redistribution reacts to an adverse
shock that strengthens the perceived role of fate in the distribution of income.
In this framework people derive disutility from social injustice, defined as
welfare allocations that result from random luck instead of merit. We model
the adverse shock as the increase in the expected volatility of income due
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to factors that are not under the agent’s control. We show that the shock
leads to increasing the demand for redistribution aimed at counteracting the
effect of luck.
To test this relation, we then assemble a novel dataset by matching the
peak ground acceleration (PGA) recorded throughout the National Strong
Motion Network during the L’Aquila earthquake with nationally represen-
tative survey data about individual opinions and beliefs that were collected
18 months after the shock. PGA is the largest peak acceleration recorded
at a site during a seismic event. Unlike the Richter and moment magnitude
scales, it is not a measure of the total energy of the earthquake, but rather
of how hard the earth shakes on the surface at a given geographic point
(Douglas, 2003). It thus provides an objective indicator of the intensity with
which the shakes are perceived by residents. Data on PGA are drawn from
the strong motion database ITACA (ITalian ACcelerometric Archive), which
relies on 1337 accelerometric stations installed in the most active seismic ar-
eas of Italy, with an average spacing between stations of approximately 20
km (Gorini et al., 2010).
The empirical analysis illustrates how, consistently with theoretical re-
sults, the intensity of the shakes is associated with subsequent stronger be-
liefs that, for a society to be fair, income inequalities should be levelled by
redistribution.
The natural experiment provided by the earthquake allows circumvent-
ing the endogeneity problems that are usually at stake in the analysis of
individual preferences and opinions. However, other issues may prevent a
correct identification of the effect of the shock. Since preferences for redis-
tribution can be biased by unobserved local factors and personal traits, we
control for province fixed effects and for a series of individual traits including
demographic characteristics, socio-economic status, political opinions, reli-
gious beliefs, news consumption, and possible downturns in the economic
well-being of the household.
The damages and the emotional impact of an earthquake can be endoge-
nously limited, for example through the strengthening of anti-seismic mea-
sures (Kahn, 2005). In addition, people evacuated from damaged buildings
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could selfishly demand redistribution for alleviating their personal state of
need, rather than because of a change in their beliefs. To address this issue,
we run robustness checks considering only those areas where the earthquake
did not cause any damage.
Finally, to rule out the possibility that our results capture a spurious
correlation, we develop a counterfactual by generating 5,921 placebo earth-
quakes with the same intensity and a similar propagation pattern of the
L’Aquila event, one for each Italian municipality outside of the actual epi-
central area. We repeat the procedure 20,000 times to observe how the
counterfeit shakes relate to preferences for redistribution. For the sake of
robustness, we also repeat the test by assuming a different geometry of prop-
agation. Placebo tests support our results.
Our contribution bridges two strands of the literature. The first investi-
gates the determinants of the individual demand for redistribution by ana-
lyzing the role of mobility prospects (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and Ok, 2001),
fairness ( Alesina and Angeletos, 2005;Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009), beliefs
about equality of opportunities (Fong, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005),
religion (Dills and Hérnandez-Julian, 2014; Kirchmaier et al., 2018) empathy
and altruism (Dahlberg et al., 2012; Yamamura, 2012), and aspects of social
capital (Algan et al., 2016; Cerqueti et al., 2016). We add to this field by
showing how the desire for fairness leads those who witnessed the potential
role of exogenous unfortunate events to more strongly dislike inequalities
thus supporting redistribution. Such a mechanism was only implicitly hy-
pothesized in Piketty (1995) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) but, to the
best of our knowledge, it was never empirically tested in the literature.
The second strand studies the effect of natural disasters on macroeco-
nomic and behavioral outcomes such as institutional change (Belloc et al.,
2016), growth (Skidmore and Toya, 2002), trust (Toya and Skidmore, 2014;
Calo-Blanco et al., 2017), risk attitudes (Eckel et al., 2009; Said et al., 2015),
well-being (Rehdanz et al., 2015), and time preferences (Callen, 2015; Cassar
et al., 2017). We add to this literature by revealing that natural disasters can
trigger an unexpected chain of reactions possibly influencing redistributive
policies. Methodologically, we differentiate from previous studies by imple-
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menting a continuous measure of seismic shocks in the empirical analysis. For
example, Belloc et al. (2016) capture the intensity of the shock through a bi-
nary measure of whether the earthquake was ’destructive’ or ’felt’. Skidmore
and Toya (2002) and Toya and Skidmore (2014) assess a country’s exposure
to disasters as the number of significant events occurred in a certain period.
Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016), Hosono et al. (2016) and Calo-Blanco et al.
(2017) use a dummy variable capturing the individual exposure to earth-
quakes. To overcome measurement errors, we employ a continuous indicator
exactly capturing how hard the shakes were felt by inhabitants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the
theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the dataset we assembled by
matching the information concerning L’Aquila earthquake with survey data.
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and discusses the robustness of
results. In section 5 we draw some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
To analyze how adverse shocks such as natural disasters affect demand for
redistribution, we build on a simplified version of the theoretical framework
proposed by Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
Let us assume a continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Individual
income (yi) depends on merit (Ai) and random luck (ηi):
yi = Ai + ηi,
where ηi is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and ση variance. This shock
represents all factors of socioeconomic success that are not under the vol-
untary control of i such as, for example, the fortune of being born in the
right place into the right family or the misfortune of experiencing an adverse
shock like an earthquake. Individual features and luck are uncorrelated, so
that Cov(Ai, ηi) = 0. Agents live for one period and consume their whole
income.
Following Meltzer and Richard (1981) and similarly to Sabatini et al.
(2017), we assume that the public sector implements a redistributive scheme
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such that incomes are taxed at rate t, and tax revenues are redistributed
evenly among agents. Disposable income is given by
ci = (1− t)yi +G, (1)
where G = ty, and y =
´ 1
0 yidi.
In line with Alesina and Angeletos (2005) individual preferences are given
by
Ui = ci − γΩ,
where Ω measures the disutility caused by “social injustice”, i.e. welfare
allocations that are perceived as unfair because they result from random luck
instead of merit. The parameter γ can be interpreted as a measure of the
aversion to ’social injustice’. A social allocation is unfair when it deviates
from what agents should get based on their merit yˆi = Ai. We assume
Ω =
ˆ 1
0
(ci − yˆi)2 di.
Given the definition of G, and Cov(Ai, ηi) = 0, after some manipulation
we find
Ω = (1− t)2ση + t2σA,
where σA ≡ V ar(A).
The individual agent’s expected utility is
E[Ui] = E(ci)− γΩ = (1− t)Ai + ty − γ
(
(1− t)2ση + t2σA
)
. (2)
An analysis of equation (2) shows that agents may demand redistribution,
i.e. a positive tax rate, for two reasons. First, there is a ’selfish’ motive for
desiring redistribution since agents gain from a positive tax rate as long as
their expected income is lower than the mean income. Second, if individ-
uals care about social outcomes they demand a positive tax rate to reduce
the ’unfairness’ of the market allocation. This is the altruistic or fairness
motive for redistribution. The disutility generated by unfair allocations, Ω,
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is minimized by tΩ = ση/(ση + σA), which is an increasing function of the
variability of ’luck’. Redistribution reduces unfairness when luck is more
relevant in determining income and consumption distributions.
Individual agents choose their desired tax rate (t∗i ) by maximizing (2)
with respect to t so that:
t∗i =
2γση + y −Ai
2γ(ση + σA)
. (3)
Individual demand for redistribution is positive (t∗ > 0) if (and only if)
2γση + y−Ai > 0. As long as luck affects individual income (ση > 0), there
is always a positive demand for redistribution due to the fairness motive; on
the other hand, selfish demand for redistribution is a negative linear function
of expected income Ai, and it is positive only for agents with below-average
expected income (Ai < y). Agents with above-average expected income
will demand a positive tax rate if their altruistic motive for redistribution is
stronger than their (negative) selfish one.
Now, assume that an adverse shock such as a natural disaster affects
agents’ perception of the relevance that ’luck’ plays in economic outcomes.
If the exact distribution of ηi, and in particular its variance ση, is unknown to
the agents, it is reasonable to represent the effect of the shock as an increase
in ση. The individual response to a higher variability of luck is:
dt∗i
dση
=
2γσA − (y −Ai)
2γ(ση + σA)2
. (4)
The net result on the individual desired tax rate depends on two effects.
The first one is positive and common to all agents because the tax rate
that minimizes the disutility of social unfairness, tΩ = ση/(ση + σA), is
an increasing function of ση. The second influence is positive for people
with above average expected income, while it is negative for agents who
expect to be in the lower half of income distribution. The result may at first
look counterintuitive. What happens is that higher variability of income
due to pure luck raises Ω, the disutility due to unfair allocations. Agents
in both classes, in deciding their demand for redistribution, place a stronger
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emphasis on the altruistic rather than on the selfish motive. The high income
individuals have zero selfish demand for redistribution; therefore attaching
a higher weight to the altruistic motive raises the optimal tax rate. On the
contrary, the desired tax rate for relatively low income agents would be 100%
if they acted based on the selfish motive only. If social unfairness is higher
they move their optimal tax rate closer to the social unfairness minimizing
one, tΩ; against their own interest they demand lower redistribution. A
similar mechanism is explored in more detail in Sabatini et al. (2017).
In our empirical investigation, we assess how the average support for
redistribution, corresponding to the average tax rate t¯∗ =
´ 1
0 t
∗
i di, is affected
by the L’Aquila earthquake1. The model’s prediction is that the response is
unambiguously positive:
d
dση
t¯∗ =
d
´ 1
0 t
∗
i di
dση
=
σA
(ση + σA)2
> 0. (5)
The rationale is the following. Changes in the individual desired tax
rate due to the selfish motive for redistribution are linear in the difference
between average and individual expected income (see equation 4); therefore
they cancel out on average. The response of the desired tax rate to the shock
is driven by the fairness motive only, which demands higher redistribution
following an increase in the variability of luck.
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 The Italian strong motion database and the L’Aquila
earthquake
Data on the L’Aquila earthquake are drawn from the Italian strong mo-
tion database ITACA (ITalian ACcelerometric Archive). ITACA was devel-
oped during different projects in the framework of an agreement between the
Italian Department of Civil Protection (DPC) and the National Institute of
1Several authors model support for redistribution as the desired tax rate through which
redistribution is financed. In addition to Alesina and Angeletos (2005), see among others
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and Algan et al. (2016).
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Geophysics and Volcanology (Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia,
INGV).
The current release of the database (v. 2.2, June 2017) contains 32,271
three-component accelerometric waveforms generated by 1,524 earthquakes
with magnitude greater than 3.0 occurred in Italy between February 1972
and December 2016. ITACA contains strong motion data recorded by the
major Italian networks as well as, for events occurred at the Italian bor-
ders, by neighboring networks abroad. As shown in figure 1, a total of 1,337
accelerometric stations are currently in operation, with the most (673) be-
longing to the Italian Strong Motion Network (IT) − also known as Rete
Accelerometrica Nazionale (RAN) − operated by DPC, and 259 belonging
to the Italian National Seismic Motion Network (IV), operated by INGV.
For each seismic event recorded, main parameters provided by the ac-
celerometric stations include: station’s distance from the epicenter (Repi,
km); station’s subsoil category according to the Eurocode 8 (EC8) classifica-
tion; peak ground acceleration (PGA, cm/s2), peak ground velocity (PGV,
cm/s) and peak ground displacement (PGD, km) recorded during the seismic
shaking.
On 6 April 2009, 01:32:40 UTC, an earthquake of moment magnitude
MW 6.3 occurred close to L’Aquila, a town of 68,500 inhabitants in Cen-
tral Italy. The hypocenter was 8.3 km depth along a NW-SW normal fault
with SW dip (i.e. the angle formed by the fault plane and the horizon-
tal direction). About 300 people died because of the collapse of residential
and public buildings, and damage was widespread in L’Aquila and its neigh-
boring municipalities (Ameri et al., 2009). Table 1 reports the metadata
of the L’Aquila earthquake. The event represents the fourth largest earth-
quake recorded by strong motion instruments in Italy (i.e. since 1972), after
the 23/11/1980 MW 6.9 Irpinia, the 30/10/2016 MW 6.5 Norcia, and the
06/05/1976 MW 6.4 Friuli earthquakes, and it is the only big earthquake
whose information can be matched with subsequent survey data concerning
preferences for redistribution.
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Figure 1: Map of the seismic networks included in the ITACA v. 2.2 strong motion
database. Source: authors’ elaboration on data described in the text.
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Table 1: Metadata of the L’Aquila first shake as reported in
the ITACA database
ID IT-2009-0009
Date-Time 06/04/2009, 01:32:40 UTC
Name L_AQUILA
Nation Italy
Region Abruzzo
Municipality L’Aquila
Latitude (decimal degrees) 42.342 N
Longitude (decimal degrees) 13.380 E
Hypocentral depth, H (km) 8.3
Local magnitude, ML 5.9
Moment Magnitude, MW 6.3
Style of faulting Normal faulting
Number of recording stations 62
This event comprises the first and strongest shock and several after-
shocks. We observe seven aftershocks of moment magnitude larger than or
equal to 5, the strongest of which occurred on April 7 (MW = 5.6) and
April 9 (MW = 5.6;MW = 5.4) (Ameri et al., 2009). A total of 19 weaker
(ML between 4.0 and 5.4) yet again surface (H ≤ 17.1 km) shocks were
recorded by a radius of 15-20 km around the mainshock’s epicenter during
the same day and the following three days (Luzi et al., 2017). The effects of
the L’Aquila event event were recorded by a total of 62 ITACA acceleromet-
ric stations. In our empirical analysis, we use the maximum PGA recorded
across these different shake and aftershakes to measure the intensity with
which the earthquakes were felt at each geographic location. Figure 2 shows
the PGA locally recorded by the 62 stations over the whole Italian territory.
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Figure 2: PGA values recorded by the ITACA accelerometric stations during the
L’Aquila first shake (IT-2009-0009) and PGA spatially interpolated contours. Source:
authors’ elaboration on data described in the text.
The maximum PGA value of the first shake (IT-2009-0009) − represent-
ing one of the highest values ever recorded in Italy (Ameri et al., 2009) −
was measured at a distance of 4.9 km from the epicenter. Noteworthy, two
stations closer to the epicenter (1.8 and 2.2 km) recorded lower PGA values
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(355.46 and 306.43 cm/s2, respectively). Conversely, the minimum positive
PGA value (0.94 cm/s2) was recorded at a distance of 275.2 km from the
epicenter.
To trace the spatial variability of the ground motion in the epicentral
area, we spatially interpolated the PGA values recorded by each station.
Data interpolation was performed using the Kriging algorithm (Davis and
Sampson, 1986), which predicts unknown values using variograms to express
the spatial variation and minimizes the error of predicted values.
As shown in the close-up map of Figure 2, a PGA minimum threshold of
10 cm/s2 was graphically set to filter out those areas affected to a marginal
extent by the event. As apparent, the effects of the earthquake do not prop-
agate uniformly across the ground, but are rather strongly influenced by the
geomorphological structures encountered along its path. The area of maxi-
mum PGA occurs inside the surface projection of the fault. Note that the
PGA contours are elongated in the north–south direction. The attenuation
of PGA with distance from the epicenter looks strongly asymmetric, with
higher decay rate towards the west (Ameri et al., 2009). The spatial inter-
polation allows us to accurately reconstruct the ground acceleration felt in
each municipality of the epicentral area during the earthquake.
3.2 The Itanes survey
The survey data employed in this paper are provided by the Italian Na-
tional Election Studies (Itanes), an inter-university consortium promoting
research on voting behavior in Italy. In this analysis we employ the “2011-
2013 Inter-electoral panel study” released in 2014. Even if the study provides
longitudinal data covering the 2011-13 period, questions concerning the tax
system were only asked in the first wave, making it impossible to exploit
the panel dimension of the data for studying support for redistribution. We
thus only consider interviews administered in the first wave that took place18
months after the earthquake, in February 2011, to a sample stratified by gen-
der, age, education, region, and the demographic size of municipalities, as
partitioned into 5 classes.
As for our dependent variable, individual preferences about redistribu-
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tion are measured by recoding responses to the question: “Tell me to what
extent do you agree with the statement: “For a society to be fair, the govern-
ment should reduce differences in the socio-economic conditions of people”,
possible responses being “Strongly agree”, “Agree”, “Not agree nor disagree”,
“Disagree” and “Strongly disagree”. “Strongly agree” and “Agree” responses
were coded as 1 to obtain a dummy variable capturing support for redistribu-
tion. This indicator has been often used, with slight differences, to measure
the individuals’ demand for redistribution (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005; Guiso et al., 2006; Algan et al., 2016).
For example, Algan et al. (2016) measure the individual demand for
redistribution through the score given by World Values Survey (WVS) re-
spondents to the following statements: “Incomes should be made more equal”
versus “We need larger income differences as incentives”. Guiso et al. (2006)
derive an indicator of demand for redistribution from the 7 points-scale de-
gree to which respondents of the US General Social Survey (GSS) feel close
to the statements “Some people think the government ought to reduce the
income differences between the rich and the poor” versus “Others think that
the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences”.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) model the extent of redistribution desired by
individuals as their optimal tax rate, and measure it via the score given by
GSS respondents to the question: “Should the government reduce income
differences between rich and poor?”. Similar indicators were used to mea-
sure support for redistribution by Corneo and Gruner (2002), Luttmer and
Singhal (2011) and Dahlberg et al. (2012), to name just a few.
The survey also includes information on demographic characteristics,
socio-economic status, political opinions, news consumption, and possible
downturns in the economic well-being of the household which we consider as
additional controls in our econometric model. Table 2 reports the descrip-
tive statistics, while Table 5 in the Appendix presents the definitions of the
explanatory variables.
We then match survey data with the information on the ground accel-
eration registered throughout the National Strong Motion Network during
the earthquake. Each survey respondent is attributed the PGA felt in her
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municipality of residence.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Redistribution 2,248 0.778 0.416 0 1
L’Aquila PGA 2,248 7.452 21.290 0 370.64
Age 2,247 51.226 18.124 18 98
Male 2,248 0.537 0.499 0 1
Education 2,248 2.344 0.899 0 4
Father’s education 2,248 1.372 1.100 0 4
Country’s econ situation 2,225 1.819 0.826 1 5
Family’s econ welfare 2,242 2.464 0.775 1 5
Political engagement 2,248 0.405 0.491 0 1
Right wing 1,641 5.018 2.884 0 10
Worker 2,248 0.317 0.465 0 1
Religion 1,893 0.925 0.263 0 1
TV news 2,248 0.673 0.469 0 1
Internet 2,248 0.257 0.437 0 1
Newspapers 1,893 0.588 0.492 0 1
3.3 Empirical strategy
To study the relationship between natural disasters, e.g. the L’Aquila
earthquake, and demand for redistribution, we consider a linear probability
model, where our dependent variable is the dummy described above. Indeed,
given a random sample, the OLS regression produces consistent and unbiased
estimators of the coefficients. Heteroskedasticity is accounted for by robust
standard errors clustered at the province level (Wooldridge, 2002).
With respect to our variable of interest, the exogeneity of the earthquake
allows to circumvent the endogeneity issues that are commonly at stake in
the analysis of individual beliefs. Exposure to natural disasters may also be
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affected by individual choices. There is evidence that people move from areas
frequently struck by recurrent events, such as tornados in the United States,
to reduce risk Boustan et al. (2012). However, no such evidence has ever been
found in Europe and with respect to earthquakes, which have a remarkably
lower frequency and predictability. The latest seismic event registered in the
Province of L’Aquila took place on May 1985, 24 years before the earthquake
we consider in this paper. The 1985 event had ML = 4.2 and did not cause
fatalities or injuries. Census data provided by the Italian National Institute
of Statistics clearly show that neither emigration took place from L’Aquila
nor, more in general, any significant change occurred in the population of
the area in the following years. After 1992, census data rather registered
a slight increase in the population living in L’Aquila and the surrounding
municipalities. These facts overall suggest that residents of the area did not
select themselves in some way.
Other factors, however, can prevent an accurate identification of the effect
of the earthquake on individual beliefs. Preferences for redistribution can be
influenced by unobserved local factors and individual characteristics. To
tackle this issue, we control for province fixed effects and for a battery of
personal traits. Thus, the equation we estimate is:
redistributioni = α+ βL
′AquilaPGAc + γXi + dp + εi (6)
where L′AquilaPGA is the peak ground acceleration at the centroid of
the respondent municipality of residence, X is a vector of individual-specific
characteristics collected in the Itanes survey, and dp is a set of province
dummies.
People who personally suffered from the material damages caused by
the earthquake may express a selfish demand for redistribution that does
not necessarily reflect a change in their beliefs. To overcome this problem,
we run a robustness check by excluding from the sample the areas where
material damages were reported.
Even so, it is still conceivable that our results capture a spurious cor-
relation driven by a coincidence. To rule out this possibility, we develop
16
a counterfactual by generating a placebo earthquake in all similar to the
L’Aquila event and randomly assigning its epicenter to the municipalities in
which the accelerometric stations registered a null PGA during the actual
earthquake. By replicating the propagation pattern of the L’Aquila event,
we are able to reconstruct how the shakes would have been felt in each mu-
nicipality laying in the counterfeit epicentral area. We randomly repeat this
procedure 20,000 times for the sake of robustness. In a further check, we
repeat the procedure assuming a different propagation pattern of the shakes.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Table 3 reports the main results. The baseline estimation reported in col-
umn 1 shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient for coefficient
L’AquilaPGA, thus suggesting that larger PGA values for the L’Aquila event
are associated with a stronger preference for redistribution. This finding still
holds after controlling for age, sex, education. In column 2 we include an
indicator of the family background given by the educational qualification of
the respondent’s father, the perceived economic situation of the country and
the self-reported level of the household economic welfare. As expected, as
the household welfare is perceived to improve, individuals are less likely to
support redistributive policies. On the other hand, the perceived economic
situation of the country is not a significant predictor of the individual de-
mand for redistribution, consistently with previous literature on the selfish
motives for redistribution (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In column 3
we control for the political orientation of respondents. In line with stan-
dard predictions, right wing oriented individuals are less likely to support
redistribution, consistently with findings from the political science literature
(e.g. Brooks and Brady, 1999 and Gelman et al., 2007). As inherited moral
values may play a role in the individual attitudes towards social justice and
redistribution, we follow Guiso et al. (2006) and test how our dependent
variable relates to religious beliefs. As in Guiso et al. (2006), we use a bi-
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nary variable equal to 1 in case respondents are Christians or Jews and 0
otherwise. Differently from them we find no significant results (column 4).
The two findings, however, are not inconsistent, as Guiso et al. (2006) car-
ried out their analysis at the cross-country level, where larger variability is
observed. As reported in Table 1, roughly 92% of the Itanes sample declared
to be Christian or Jew. In columns 5 and 6 we control for news consumption
through television and the Internet to test for the possible role of informa-
tion (see for example Kuzmienko et al., 2015). In either cases coefficients
are not significant. We also control for the use of other types of media and
contents, the work status of respondents and their self-reported interest in
politics, with no significant results.2
2There results are not shown in tables for the sake of brevity but are available upon
request.
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Table 3: L’Aquila earthquake and support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L’Aquila PGA 0.286***
(0.014)
0.212***
(0.033)
0.162***
(0.045)
0.190***
(0.039)
0.212***
(0.033)
0.211***
(0.033)
Age 0.009
(0.050)
0.019
(0.051)
0.014
(0.070)
0.048
(0.057)
0.014
(0.053)
0.023
(0.054)
Male 0.023
(0.038)
0.025
(0.038)
0.007
(0.047)
0.027
(0.043)
0.026
(0.038)
0.027
(0.038)
Education 0.028
(0.023)
0.027
(0.025)
0.026
(0.031)
0.027
(0.028)
0.026
(0.024)
0.026
(0.024)
Father’s education 0.021
(0.018)
0.010
(0.026)
0.023
(0.024)
0.020
(0.018)
0.020
(0.018)
Country econ. situation -0.021
(0.028)
-0.019
(0.032)
-0.029
(0.030)
-0.020
(0.028)
-0.021
(0.028)
Household econ. welfare -.061**
(0.027)
-.069*
(0.040)
-.072*
(0.038)
-.062**
(0.027)
-.061**
(0.027)
Right wing -.017*
(0.009)
Religion -0.082
(0.056)
TV news consumption 0.031
(0.046)
Internet consumption 0.014
(0.046)
Constant 0.385*
(0.216)
0.557**
(0.246)
0.746**
(0.349)
0.570*
(0.295)
0.551**
(0.247)
0.544**
(0.252)
Observations 2,247 2,220 1,627 1,875 2,220 2,220
R-squared 0.597 0.606 0.684 0.649 0.607 0.606
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
In a further robustness check aimed at disentangling the selfish need for
public aid possibly caused by the earthquake damages from changes in the
individuals concerns about redistribution, we test whether our results still
hold after excluding from the sample the area that was most hit by the
seismic event. As reported in Table 4, the coefficient estimates obtained
on this subsample are comparable in terms of magnitude and statistical
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significance to the ones observed on the full sample. Thus, the finding that
experiencing an earthquake is positively related to stronger preferences for
redistribution is confirmed even dropping the observations where the demand
for redistributive policies for selfish motives is likely to be stronger.
Table 4: L’Aquila earthquake and support for redistribution outside of the
epicentral area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L’Aquila PGA 0.288***
(0.014)
0.213***
(0.033)
0.166***
(0.045)
0.193***
(0.039)
0.213***
(0.033)
0.212***
(0.033)
Age 0.000
(0.049)
0.014
(0.051)
0.006
(0.070)
0.042
(0.056)
0.009
(0.052)
0.020
(0.053)
Male 0.027
(0.038)
0.029
(0.038)
0.007
(0.047)
0.028
(0.043)
0.030
(0.038)
0.031
(0.038)
Education 0.026
(0.023)
0.023
(0.025)
0.022
(0.031)
0.023
(0.028)
0.022
(0.024)
0.020
(0.024)
Father’s education 0.025
(0.018)
0.012
(0.026)
0.025
(0.024)
0.024
(0.018)
0.024
(0.018)
Country econ. situation -.023
(0.028)
-.019
(0.032)
-.029
(0.030)
-.022
(0.028)
-.023
(0.028)
Household econ. welfare -.061**
(0.027)
-.068*
(0.041)
-.071*
(0.038)
-.062**
(0.027)
-.061**
(0.027)
Right wing -.016*
(0.009)
Religion -.080
(0.056)
TV news consumption 0.030
(0.045)
Internet consumption 0.023
(0.045)
Constant 0.420**
(0.213)
0.580**
(0.244)
0.776**
(0.350)
0.595**
(0.294)
0.574**
(0.245)
0.559**
(0.251)
Observations 2,192 2,165 1,583 1,830 2,165 2,165
R-squared 0.594 0.604 0.681 0.646 0.605 0.604
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
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4.2 Placebo test
To further check the robustness of our results, we implement a placebo
test in the spirit of Abadie and Hainmueller (2010) and Belloc et al. (2016).
We generate a series of placebo earthquakes with the same maximum inten-
sity of the L’Aquila event but having their epicenter in the centroid of any of
the 5,921 municipalities falling outside the actual epicentral area, i.e. those
municipalities in which the strong motion network registered a null PGA
during the earthquake. For each placebo event, we reconstruct a propaga-
tion pattern by calculating the PGA of the shakes striking each municipality
laying in the counterfeit epicentral area based on the relationship between
the distance from the epicenter and the ground acceleration observed in the
L’Aquila event. We then randomly assign the epicenter of the placebo shake
to the municipalities not hit by the L’Aquila event, and repeat this procedure
20,000 times. This allows us to estimate the reaction of the individuals in
the sample to a swarm of placebo earthquakes with epicenter in any of the
5,921 Italian municipalities outside of the L’Aquila epicentral area. More
specifically, the test is developed along the following steps.
First, the PGA values recorded by the accelerometric stations during the
actual earthquake are averaged for each municipality; for the epicenter’s mu-
nicipality (L’Aquila), for example, a mean PGA value of 467.87 cm/s2 was
achieved. This allows to impute to those municipalities covered by more than
one accelerometric station one and only one PGA value. Second, we build
a stylized version of the L’Aquila event by assuming that the shakes propa-
gate uniformly across the ground, so that the related PGA values decrease
uniformly from the epicenter as a sole function of the radial distance. As a
result, the false epicentral areas have a circular geometry and are partitioned
into a number of circular sectors, each one with a decreasing value of PGA
according to the distance from the placebo epicenter. For the sake of robust-
ness, we implement the simulation of the propagation pattern according to
two different criteria: we produce two partitions of the false epicentral areas
into 15 and 22 zones and develop accordingly two separated placebo tests
relative to each partition. The size and PGA values of the two partitions are
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exemplified in detail in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix.
Then, after imputing to the i municipality the maximum mean PGA
value of the epicenter’s municipality (467.87 cm/s2), the PGA values of each
circular sector have been calculated by averaging the PGA values of all mu-
nicipalities comprised in that specific radial bin, i.e. by considering the
radial distance of the centroid of those municipalities from the centroid of
the epicenter municipality.
Eventually, two placebo tests have been applied to Itanes respondents,
corresponding to two placebo earthquakes, “placebo1” and “placebo2”, for
each municipality outside the epicentral area. Figure 3 provides an example
of the application of the “placebo1” event, whose geometry is described in
detail in Table 6 in the Appendix, to the municipalities of Milan (3a) and
Naples (3b). The geometry of the “placebo2” earthquake is described in
detail in Table 7 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Example of the application of the placebo test based on the
“placebo1” geometry (see Table 6) on the IT-2009-0009 shake to the mu-
nicipalities of: (a) Milan; (b) Naples.
Following Belloc et al. (2016), the purpose of the tests is to check how
many times the randomly generated placebo estimates happen to be too close
to our true estimate. If in our main results we were erroneously rejecting
the null hypothesis that our coefficient of interest is equal to 0 (i.e., we
were attributing to earthquakes an effect that does not exist in reality), we
should observe placebo coefficients close to our true estimate. We run 20,000
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simulations of the baseline specification reported in column (1) of Table 3. As
can be seen from Figure 4, the estimates generated in the placebo1 test are
almost always to the left (meaning smaller in value than) the true estimated
coefficient, equal to 0.286. Coefficients of the counterfeit earthquakes are
distributed around zero.
Figure 4: Kernel density function of the 20,000 placebo point estimates
obtained based on the “placebo1” geometry as randomly assigned to the
5,921 municipalities falling outside the actual epicentral area.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we document that individuals who experienced one of the
major earthquakes occurred in Italy in the last three decades exhibit on
average a significantly stronger preference for redistribution. This finding
supports the theory that demand for redistribution also depends on individ-
ual concerns about the fairness of social competition. Unfortunate exoge-
nous shocks like natural disasters can raise the belief that luck matters more
than merit in determining one’s position in the social ladder. Other stud-
ies previously documented, theoretically and empirically, that beliefs about
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the importance of luck are a good predictor of the individual support for
redistribution (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). The natural experiment provided by the
L’Aquila earthquake allows us to bring evidence that the demand for redis-
tribution is associated to the intensity with which individuals objectively
experienced an exogenous and randomly distributed shock.
Despite the exogeneity of the earthquake, several issues related to the
cross-sectional nature of the data can prevent a correct identification of its
impact on preferences for redistribution. To deal with identification concerns,
we developed a counterfactual and used it to perform placebo tests. Results
of the tests suggest an interpretation of our findings consistent with the
theoretical predictions.
Although this work has focused on a specific natural disaster, the mech-
anism illustrated in the theoretical model and documented empirically may
prove important in other contexts, even in light of its policy implications.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Guiso et al. (2006), in fact, document a re-
lation between the proportion of people supporting redistribution and the
share of GDP spent on social welfare across countries and American states
respectively. Given the implications that consensus for redistribution has
on the actual implementation of redistributive policies, our findings call for
further investigations on the relationships connecting natural disasters, in-
dividuals’ opinions and beliefs, and public policies.
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Appendix
Table 5: Description of variables
L’Aquila PGA Maximum PGA recorded in the municipality of
residence out of the 8 events occurred on
6/4/2009
Age Log of age
Gender Dummy equal to 1 if respondent is male
Education Ordinal variable coded as follows: 0=No
education; 1=Primary school; 2=Junior high
school; 3=High school; 4=University
Father’s education Ordinal variable for the educational attainment
of respondents’ father
Country’s econ. situation Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 that codes
the response to the question: "In your opinion,
the economic situation of Italy in the last year
is:" 1= greatly worse; 2= partially worse;
3=unchanged; 4=partially improved; 5=greatly
improved
Household econ. situation Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 that codes
the response to the question: "In your opinion,
the economic situation of your family in the last
year is:" 1= greatly worse; 2= partially worse;
3=unchanged; 4=partially improved; 5=greatly
improved
Interest in politics Dummy equal to 1 if the interviewed declares
being interested in politics
Political orientation Ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 is
extreme left and 10 is extreme right
Work status Dummy equal to one if the interviewed has a
paid job at the time of interview
Religion Dummy equal to 1 for Christians and Jews, and
0 for other religions, atheists and agnostics, as in
Guiso et al. (2006)
TV news consumption Dummy equal to 1 is respondent watches TV
news every day
Internet news consumption Dummy equal to 1 if respondent searches for
news on the Internet
Newspapers Dummy equal to 1 if respondent reads a
newspaper at least once a week (excluding sport
newspapers)30
Table 6: PGA mean values calculated by radial distance from the L’Aquila
earthquake’s epicenter according to the “placebo1” earthquake geometry: 15
circular sectors
Circular
sector
id
Radial distance from
earthquake’s epicenter
(km)
Mean PGA
(cm/s2)
Involved mu-
nicipalities
Min Max
0 0 0 467.87 1
1 0 10 267.16 3
2 10 20 165.48 29
3 20 30 154.27 10
4 30 40 102.29 44
5 40 50 68.59 72
6 50 60 52.65 111
7 60 70 39.73 110
8 70 80 36.45 108
9 80 90 33.39 108
10 90 100 31.36 108
11 100 120 14.23 184
12 120 140 7.94 174
13 140 160 5.07 137
14 160 180 3 172
15 180 200 2.33 178
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Table 7: PGA mean values calculated by radial distance from the L’Aquila
earthquake’s epicenter according to the “placebo2” earthquake geometry: 22
circular sectors
Circular
sector
id
Radial distance from
earthquake’s epicenter
(km)
Mean PGA
(cm/s2)
Involved mu-
nicipalities
Min Max
0 0 0 467.87 1
1 0 5 360.47 1
2 5 10 220.50 2
3 10 15 195.16 4
4 15 20 178.05 13
5 20 25 155.26 16
6 25 30 127.00 6
7 30 40 102.29 44
8 40 50 68.59 72
9 50 60 52.65 1115
10 60 70 39.73 110
11 70 80 36.45 108
12 80 90 33.39 108
13 90 100 31.36 108
14 100 120 14.23 184
15 120 140 7.94 174
16 140 160 5.07 137
17 160 180 3.00 172
18 180 200 2.33 178
19 200 250 1.54 353
20 250 300 0.92 294
21 300 350 0.55 421
22 350 380 0.19 413
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